

Message Text

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TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 1, 1974

(SALT TWO -451)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY

MINISTER SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCTOBER 1, 1974

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT OCTOBER 1, 1974

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 3, 1974,
ADOPTED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, PROVIDES THAT THE 1972 INTERIM
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A NEW AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
USSR AND THE U.S. ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985.

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THUS, THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN STATES, REACHED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, HAS PLACED BEFORE THE USSR AND U.S. DELEGATIONS ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA THE CLEAR TASK OF WORKING TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THE DELEGATION HAS NOT BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SEEK ANY KIND OF ALTERNATIVES TO AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND CERTAINLY NOT ALTERNATIVES LEADING TO CONTINUING OR SPURRING A RACE IN THESE ARMAMENTS. THERE ARE NO REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES TO JOINT EFFORTS BY OUR STATES, AIMED AT CURBING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE.

OBSVIOUSLY, A CONSTRUCTIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES AT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF SUCCESSFULLY CARRYING OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN THE DELEGATIONS. ATTEMPTS TO ADVANCE PRE-CONITIONS OR IMPOSE ONE-SIDED CONCEPTS, ATTEMPTS TO PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT EITHER THERE WILL BE AN AGREEMENT IN ACCORD WITH THE PROPOSED ONE-SIDED CONDITIONS, OR THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT, WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE INTERESTS OF OUR ENDEAVOR. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE TASK OF SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

A SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION OF THE ASSIGNED TASK ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE--AND THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE OF JULY 3, 1974-- IS IN THE HIGHEST STATE INTERESTS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S., AS WELL AS IN THE INTEREST OF FURTHER INTERNATIONAL DETENT AND THE STRENGTHENING OF UNIVERSAL PEACE.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

FOR DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, UNDERSTANDING WHAT SYSTEMS MUST BE CONSIDERED AT THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF EMBODYING IN THIS

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AGREEMENT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES.

FROM THE PRINCIPLE RECORDED BETWEEN OUR STATES REGARDING THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND FROM THE NEED FOR AN OBJECTIVE ACCOUNT OF ALL THE ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, IT FOLLOWS THAT IN WORKING OUT THE

NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, LIMITATIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED ON ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, INCLUDING FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE.

IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER LIMITATIONS ON ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS. AT THE SAME TIME IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO CONSIDER LIMITATIONS ON MODERN SUBMARINES. THESE WEAPONS PLAY A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE IN THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF EACH SIDE. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT PLACING LIMITATIONS ON THESE SYSTEMS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF CURBING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE AND REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE VIEWS OF THE SIDES DO NOT DIVERGE ON THIS SCORE.

IN THE AREA OF LIMITING THESE TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THE SIDES HAVE CONSIDERABLE POSITIVE EXPERIENCE, WHICH IS EMBODIED IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE MAY 26, 1972 INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH IS IN FORCE. THIS AGREEMENT, AS YOU KNOW, WAS CONCLUDED FOR THE TERM THROUGH 1977, BUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A NUMBER OF VERY IMPORTANT SOLUTIONS FOUND BY THE SIDES AND CONTAINED THEREIN EXTENDS BEYOND THIS TIME FRAME AS WELL.

IN DISCUSSING THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE QUESTIONS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC BOMBERS, AS YOU KNOW, ARE AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, CURRENTLY IN FORCE, DOES NOT PLACE ANY LIMITS ON THEM. NO THAT WE HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED THE TASK OF EXPLORING WAYS FOR REACHING A NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, THIS TYPE OF STRATEGIC

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OFFENSIVE WEAPON MUST BE CONSIDERED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS FULLY SATISFYING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

AS FAR AS WE CAN JUDGE THE STATEMENTS, OF THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THIS PHASE, THE U.S. SIDE ALSO BELIEVES IT APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER AT THE NEGOTIATIONS LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC BOMBERS.

IN DISCUSSING THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER CARRIER-BASED NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT AS WELL. AS YOU KNOW, MODERN AIRCRAFT CARRIERS CONSTITUTE MOBILE SYSTEMS WITH PRACTICALLY UNLIMITED INDEPENDENCE OF MOVEMENT. IN ESSENCE THEY

ARE MOBILE AIRFIELDS. THE MOBILITY OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SUBSTANTIAL OPERATIONAL RADIUS OF THE DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD THEM GIVES THEM THE POTENTIAL CAPABILITY OF CARRYING OUT NUCLEAR STRIKES ON TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. THUS, NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD CARRIERS ARE AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS. ACCORDING TO DATA PUBLISHED IN THE U.S. PRESS, ABOARD U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT CAPABLE OF DELIVERING THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO CONSIDER FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AT THE DISPOSAL OF ONE OF THE SIDES, THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF WHICH ENABLES THEM TO STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. AT THE LAST MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION SET FORTH SOME CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE NECESSITY OF CONSIDERING FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS. THE FACT THAT ONE OF THE SIDES HAS HUNDREDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS LOCATED ON BASES IN FOREIGN TERRITORIES IS A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. IN ESSENCE THIS MEANS THAT ONE OF THE

SIDES HAS AN ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC POTENTIAL THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED IN THE CONTEXT OF WORKING OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985.

IN A NUMBER OF RECENT SOVIET-AMERICAN DOCUMENTS THE USSR AND THE U.S. ASSUMED THE OBLIGATION TO UNDERTAKE JOINT EFFORTS TOWARD ELIMINATING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. AT THE SAME TIME, IT CANNOT BE DISREGARDED THAT EXISTENCE, ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES, OF U.S. BASES AND NUMEROUS
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NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS LOCATED ON THEM AND CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, CONSIDERABLY INCREASES THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR. MOREOVER, DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BASES ON THE TERRITORIES OF FOREIGN STATES SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASES THE DANGER OF ACCIDENTAL OR UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS WHOLE QUESTION IS VERY IMPORTANT, AND THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO SET FORTH APPROPRIATE CONSIDERATIONS ON THIS MATTER IN THE FUTURE.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1974 MENTIONED SO-CALLED "CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS." I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE CONCEPT OF DIVIDING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS INTO "CENTRAL" AND "NON-CENTRAL" SYSTEMS IS UNFOUNDED AND CANNOT BE ACCEPTED IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE ESSENCE OF LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY DIVIDING THESE ARMS INTO "CENTRAL" AND "NON-CENTRAL," BUT MUST ENSUE FROM THE TOTALITY OF ALL THE FACTORS COMPRISING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROPOSE THAT THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CONSIDERED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDE INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS, MODERN SUBMARINES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS THEREON, STRATEGIC BOMBERS, CARRIER-BASED NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT, AND OTHER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WHOSE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION ENABLES THEM TO STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE (I.E. FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS). UNQUOTE.JOHNSON

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